Synthesizing secure distributed systems from security specifications


			Andrew Myers
		 Cornell University, USA

Abstract:

To be trustworthy, distributed computing systems must safeguard the
end-to-end confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
information they use. Current methods for specifying and validating
information security properties are inadequate.  This talk describes
first how information security policies can be made more expressive than
simple noninterference or access control policies, by adding notions of
ownership, declassification and robustness. These richer policies can
describe confidentiality, integrity, and even some availability
properties of systems.  Second, the talk shows how program analysis and
transformation can be used to make systems that are trustworthy by
construction.


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		Biographical Note
		-----------------

Andrew Myers received his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
from MIT in 1999, and joined the faculty of the Department of Computer Science
at Cornell, where he is now an Associate Professor. His recent work has focused
on static analyses and program transformations that control information flow in
order to enforce confidentiality and integrity properties of complex systems.
Broader research interests include computer security, design and implementation
of programming languages, and persistent and distributed objects.